Why Europe Intervenes in Africa: Security Prestige and the Legacy of Colonialism by Catherine Gegout

Author:Catherine Gegout [Gegout, Catherine]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: political science, World, African, European
ISBN: 9780190911799
Google: xWlNDwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2018-01-01T00:30:24.480551+00:00

Core realism

Convenient relations with African leaders are the key to understanding French intervention in Africa. Loïk Le Floch-Prigent, who was CEO of Elf Aquitaine between July 1989 and 1993, said that stability (or convenient relations) was essential for the exploitation of oil (Al Jazeera 2013). But even when there are few direct economic interests, such as in Chad and the CAR, convenient relations are still essential. French elites do not want to see the disintegration of African state institutions. This could impact other states, with economic and social consequences such as violence, migration, terrorism and illegal trafficking. French elites agreed or refused to intervene in African states order to maintain ‘cooperative’ leaders in power, or remove ‘uncooperative’ leaders. By doing so, France wants to ensure the stability of regions surrounding a conflict area. When France intervened in the CAR in 2013, the French government made it clear that the stability of the region was crucial (French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 14/02/14). France was warned that ‘if the CAR goes under, the already fragile stability of the whole region will be gravely at risk’ (International Crisis Group 2013). There was also a risk of partition of the CAR. A fragile state could be a long-term problem for the fight against terrorism, especially with the presence of the LRA in the CAR and Boko Haram in Nigeria and Cameroon.

France makes sure that migration is limited, but past French intervention did not take place for fear of increased migration. There is as much risk of migration whether an intervention takes place or not. France, like EU states in general, accepts few migrants and asylum seekers. For migrants from Africa, France was the main target, followed by Italy. Over the 2001–10 period, France gave permanent residence to Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians and citizens of Mali, Senegal, Cameroon and the DRC. Italy gave residence to citizens from Morocco. In 2011, France gave residence to approximately 50,000 citizens from African states. A limited number of asylum seekers went to France. For instance, in 2007: 2,000 came from the DRC; 1,000 from Guinea, Algeria and Congo; and 600 from Ivory Coast and Mali. More generally, in 2012, France accepted 6,000 refugees from the rest of the world (out of 36,000 applicants), and in comparison, the United Kingdom accepted 7,000 (out of 15,000) and Germany 5,000 (out of 30,000). The refugee crisis in the Mediterranean and southern Europe which started in 2015 shows that previous discourse on the threat of migration into Europe was unrealistic, as migration at that time was a minimal problem for Europeans.

France makes sure that its military bases are safe. It intervened in Gabon in 1990, Djibouti in 1991 and the CAR in 1996–97 in order to protect its bases. In 1989, analysts believed that ‘France shows no sign of reducing its role in Africa’ (Aldrich and Connell 1989: 9). Today this is still true, as France is still present in Africa with three permanent military bases, three unofficial bases and the deployment of temporary troops.

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